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Introduction 
The article is directed toward an investigation of principles of government 
economic behavior. More precisely, her object of research is the use of the tax burden 
to regulate the economy. As is known ones of the main functions of taxes are fiscal 
function, when the government collects taxes in order to fulfill the budget for 
providing its own economic and social policy, and also regulatory function, 
consisting in the adjustment of the state’s economic policy and of appropriate 
economic relations. 
The research of tax behaviour of governments cover in fiscal direction the 
problems of budgeting, issues of optimal taxation rate for maximizing of budget 
revenue (see e.g. Mirrlees, 1971, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972, Aiyagari et al, 2002). 
On the other hand, in the area of economy's regulation research of tax behaviour is a 
key tool for clarification the mechanism of functioning of incentives for economic 
development of the country. Usually, by increasing taxes the government, ceteris 
paribus, aims to raise budget revenue. Reducing the tax burden it induces the 
additional investment inflow caused by improvement of economic environment. 
Under this fiscal aspect the government faces the contradiction between the need to 
fulfill budget and to improve the economic climate by means of adjustment of the tax 
burden. 
So, a government has three alternative variants of tax behaviour, namely, to 
reduce the tax rate in order to improve economic conditions and to attract new 
investors; to increase the tax rate as a way to raise budget revenue; or to fix the tax 
rate, i.e. refuse to use this tax instrument at all. 
The generally recent trend is decreasing of CIT rate. The analysis of CIT rate 
for 113 countries for which statistics are available from 2005 till 2016 (Corporate tax 
rates table, 2017) shows as for this time horizon  the average CIT rate reduced by 
3,84%: from 25,82% to 21,98% (for OECD countries even more – by 4,72%: from 
27,67% till 23,95%) (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. CIT change in world and OECD countries from 2005 till 2016 years 
 
 
It shows that governments use not only the financial component, but also the 
regulator when choosing their tax decisions. Certainly there are many factors 
influencing the choice of governments, but can assume in generally government tax 
behavior is based on analysis of macro-economic’s indicators. It is a main hypothesis 
of this research. Therefore the purpose of research is check dependence of 
government tax behaviour on selected indicators. 
 
  
 Literature review 
The theme financial behaviour, in particular, tax behaviour was taken up by 
(O. Weber, J. Fooken, B. Herrmann), (A. Krishna, J. Slemrod), (A. Laffer, 
W. Winegarden, J. Childs), who specifically investigated the issue of tax regulation 
to optimize the economic activity of agents. 
The government tax behavior 
The large part of research focused on the patterns of government tax behavior 
in different economic conditions. 
Mirrlees et al. (2011) in the final report from the Mirrlees Review “Tax by 
design” developed some important patterns of the government’s tax behavior, 
notably, they underlined the central role of redistribution in the tax and benefit 
system and the importance of maintaining neutrality. 
Weber et al. (2014) investigated the government behavior and taxation. They 
found that behavioral economic factors can significantly influence tax compliance, 
and if well applied, usually cause an increase in compliance; these behavioral factors 
affect decision-making in ways that are important for making good tax policy. 
Another set of papers studies the aspects of government behavior influenced by 
different institutional factors. Thus, Krishna & Slemrod (2003) analyzed the tax 
behavior of the government aiming to minimize the perceived burden addressing 
particularly to the ethical and normative implications of price presentation in the tax 
system. Avi-Yonah (2011) found general conditions under which taxation as 
regulation makes sense: it should apply to small numbers of taxpayers; the taxpayers 
are sophisticated and able to deal with complex tax incentive and the regulatory goal 
is clear and related to the level of the tax. 
Leicester et al. (2012) analyzed behavioral aspects of government’s tax and 
benefit policy intervention taking into account such behavioral insights like bounded 
rationality, framing, time inconsistency, social preferences etc. 
The administrative techniques and institutions for the management of tax 
complexity were investigated by Freedman (2015). She concluded that institutions 
can also improve tax systems and sometimes reduce complexity, but this 
simplification will only be achieved if the institutions are conceptually coherent with 
clear tax policy objectives. 
Pecorino (1995) investigated tax rates and tax revenues in a model of growth 
through human capital accumulation. The relationship between tax rates and the 
present value of tax collections is analyzed in an endogenous growth setting. In such 
a model, income taxation may reduce the size of the tax base in current and future 
periods through both labor supply and growth rate effects. 
Laffer et al. (2011) estimated the economic burden caused by complexity of the 
Tax Code. They outlined that the potential benefits to economic growth could be 
from a reduction in tax complexity. Under establishment of the low rate flat tax on a 
broad tax base the inefficiencies caused by tax code complexity, notably, 
administrative costs, time costs, and compliance costs would be substantially 
reduced. As a result, overall economic efficiency would increase, as well as the 
growth in income and wealth. 
Analysis of mutual influence of CIT and FDI 
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H., (2010) investigated the impact of tax changes 
on economic activity. Authors identified the size, timing, and principal motivation for 
all major postwar tax policy actions. It allows us to separate legislated changes into 
those taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those taken 
for more exogenous reasons. 
Schraztenstaller, Wagener and Kohler-Toglhofer (2005), Feld and Heckemeyer 
(2008) etc. confirm the negative relation between corporate taxation and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), i.e. that lower taxation rate represents stimulate the inflow of 
FDI and conversely. 
Becker (2009) confirm the corporate taxation increase results in a decrease of 
tax revenues because the lower inflow of FDI into the economy. However, this 
statement does not always correspond to practical research. Fuller pattern on the issue 
is given by the model (Chalk, 2001) that analyze classical graphical model of 
conditions of increasing the tax revenue due to the reduction of the tax burden. This 
analytical model of the optimal tax burden is rather abstract; it is could be used in 
arbitrary economic system. 
Other models of fiscal (notably tax) behavior and the impact of tax changes on 
the state of the economy were considered, in particular, in the works of Wanniski, 
1978, Judd, 1985, Chamley, 1986, Laffer, 2004, Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011, Werning, 
2007). 
Tax behaviour in EU and OECD countreis 
Afonso and Hauptmeier (2003) analyzed the determinants of government’s 
fiscal behaviour in EU countries. Their results show that the existence of effective 
fiscal rules, the degree of public spending decentralization, and the electoral cycle 
can impinge on the country’s fiscal position. 
Joumard and Kongsrud (2003) studied the government economic and fiscal 
behavior in the process of decentralization in OECD countries. They analyzed the 
spending side, the revenue side and the macroeconomic perspective of fiscal relations 
across government levels. The authors developed a set of parameters (size of 
jurisdictions, overlapping responsibilities, social transfers and redistributive goods, 
tax competition, fiscal rules and market discipline etc.) in order to assess fiscal 
relations across different levels of government. 
Another cross-country analysis was made by Bessard (2009), who calculated 
the tax oppression index (including the weight of the tax burden, the legitimacy of the 
tax system and the protection of financial privacy) for 30 OECD countries in order to 
evaluate the OECD’s fight against harmful tax competition and “tax havens”. He 
showed that the only ones to gain from this fight are unreformed high-tax states, to 
the detriment of their residents and their prosperity. 
Macek (2014) evaluated the impact of taxes on the economic growth OECD 
countries by the regression analysis, based on the model (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 
1992). 
In summary, we can conclude that current studies mainly investigate the 
government tax behaviour (policy) from the standpoint of expediency of certain 
regulatory and adjustment measures. Any government considers its own economy as 
perfect or its own tax system as optimal. But at the same time by no means all of 
them use the proposed instruments in order to improve the situation. 
The studies of the causes of this fact, which we evaluate as important, are not 
sufficiently covered in the existing literature. Notably, we consider the insufficiently 
exhaustive and clear answer about government’s tax behaviour when it chooses the 
direction of change of the tax burden in certain economic conditions. 
Consequently the purpose of this paper is to determine factors and conditions, 
which influence on government’s decision related to the choice of certain type of tax 
behaviour. This allowed us to set the following tasks: 
 to define a set of potential indicators, based on which the government makes a 
decision concerning certain economic (tax) behaviour; 
 to identify if such a dependence in fact exists; 
 to analyze which indicators influence more over the government’s economic 
behaviour; 
 to define principles (nature) of the government response, i.e. under what 
conditions the government intend to increase the tax burden, to reduce it or to keep 
it at the same level; 
 to define the character of government behaviour. 
 
  
Data and methodology 
In the article we analyze the economic behaviour of OECD governments, 
which for the purposes of study can be regarded as adjustment of the corporate tax 
burden. It should be noted that in some countries, like Germany, the CIT rates, 
established by local authorities, differ by region. In this case we used a weight-
average tax burden, adjusted by some central government. 
Now the task is to examine the possible impact of the actual economic 
efficiency of the country on government’s economic behaviour (i.e. on the changes of 
tax rates). GDP is the generally accepted indicator of power of the economy in the 
context of the world economic system while GDP per capita could be considered as 
indicator of the wealth of the economy. 
The selection and rationale of indicators 
Governments resolve on change of CIT rate, i.e. we have tax behavior. 
However because it is the behaviour of governments, that is, organizations, we 
do not consider the majority of indicators used by different theories of economic 
behavior. 
The government uses macroeconomic indicators, therefore, the task arises to 
check, 
firstly, whether are government decisions independent of these indicators? 
second, if they are dependent of those indicators whether government 
behaviour is rational or not? 
It is generally admitted that Gross domestic product (GDP) calculated in one 
way or another is the best matched characteristic of the country economic power. As 
distinct from the power of the country’s economy, its wealth is determined by GDP, 
normalized to country population – GDP per capita. 
On the other hand, as already noted above, decrease of CIT rate is an 
instrument of improve the investment climate. Therefore is advisable to consider the 
eventual influence of the value FDI (nominal, per capita, & per GDP) to change of 
CIT rate. 
Sometimes it can find the name “investment attractiveness”, but then it is 
should talk about her absolute value, and for the normalized investment attractiveness 
should use derived indicator: ratio of FDI to GDP. In order to simplify the 
terminology for the last indicator we use the term “attractiveness of investment 
climate”. 
In a priori, we do not reject any of the above indicators for evaluate the 
efficiency (power, wealth) of economy. Further in order to evaluate the efficiency of 
economy (in terms of power and wealth) we provide the formal estimation of the 
correlation between the changes of CIT rates and each of the selected indicators. 
Rationale for sample 
We chose the OECD countries for the analysis according to the following 
considerations. The more powerful are the economies, the less they are influenced by 
different externalities, and, consequently, their behaviour can be explained 
principally by internal factors and parameters of the economic system. Therefore, 
OECD countries, among which there are the most developed countries of the world, 
are the most representative for the analysis and estimation of the correlation between 
economic indicators of country and government’s behaviour. 
In addition to the above, the use in the sample the institutionally established 
group of countries increases the representativeness of the input data. Moreover, the 
available data for OECD countries is sufficiently complete and calibrated and the 
sample itself is sufficiently large: for example, more than 25% of all countries with 
available data on above indicators are OECD countries. 
The analysis of governments’ behaviour related to adjustment of the 
corporate tax burden in OECD countries 
In order to determine principles of the government’s behaviour we investigate 
the correlation between changes of CIT rates and five selected indicators, which 
could be considered as characteristics of country’s generalized economic efficiency: 
 GDP, 
 FDI, 
 GDP per capita, 
 FDI per capita, 
 FDI
GDP
. 
We explore the data for 12 years (2005-2016) for 34 OECD member countries, 
because there are no reliable data for CIT rate for previous years. 
The CIT rate change is calculated as the difference between the last and first 
indicator values. 
Methodology 
The basic element of the analysis is the eventual tax rate change by 
governments of OECD countries. Three options of government’s reaction to the state 
of macroeconomic indicators are investigated: increase CIT tax rate, decrease CIT tax 
rate and CIT tax rate invariance. Obviously, these three options are exhaustive. 
The difficulty creates a small size sample (34 countries) that can may cause a 
random or artificial statistical correlation. The method of preventing this was as 
follows: 
 for each of 5 macroeconomic indicators and for each of 3 trends tax behaviour a 
distributions matrix is formed for any possibly pairs (i, j), where i and j – first and 
last elements of the sample:  1: , 1:kX i N j N   
 where xk(i, j) – [non-]confirmation of the hypothesis about a certain type of 
dependence of change of CIT tax rates from the indicator k for the sample from j 
till i country (for convenience we will denote the confirmation of the dependence 
hypothesis by xk(i, j)=1; non-confirmation – by xk(i, j)=0); 
 k=1, 2, …, 5 – number of indicator from the set {GDP, FDI, GDP per capita, FDI 
per capita, FDI GDP}; 
 N=34 – number of OECD countries; 
 the indicators values in every case are ascending sort. 
It allow to track not only single values but also areas for which there is a 
dependence of the tax behavior from a particular indicator. The presence of such 
areas increases the probability of the conclusion of the dependence. By combination 
of for 3 tax rate change trends for each indicator possible to conclude about valid 
availability or absence of government tax behaviour, that dependence from this 
indicator. 
Such method of analysis we will designate as integral testing of hypothesis of 
independence of government tax behaviour from macroeconomic indicators. 
For confirmation or rejection of the independence hypothesis we use binomial 
asymptotic confidence interval for the mean. Binomial distribution взято (вибрано), 
because 
 analyzed events – the change annual tax rates by countries – for each of 3 
investigated cases are discrete: the event (tax rate increase, tax rate decrease or 
invariance of tax rate) occurs or no; 
 it is assumed, the government of each country makes decision regardless of the 
governments of other countries. We assume, governments of countries from 
different indicator’s values use different strategies, but the each government uses a 
certain strategy. Therefore it is desirable, that samples of countries, for which is 
observed increase, decrease and invariance trends change of CIT tax rates, do not 
intersected and in aggregate covered the whole set of countries that is their 
intersection was equal to  and union was equal to {1:N}. 
A dependence estimate government tax behaviour is determined on the на basis 
of whether it get m (the actual number of elements of sample for which is confirmed 
trend) in confidence limits: 
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If so, the deviation of the actual number of sample elements confirming the 
trend does not go beyond the statistical error; 
otherwise, there is likely dependence of indicator from sample parameters, that is 
government tax behaviour of countries, that got to the sample, differs from average 
over all OECD countries. 
The obtained results are presented in the Tables 1, 2. 
 
  
 Table 1. CIT rates in OECD countries, 2005-2016 yr. 
Country 2005 yr 2016 yr 
Changes of CIT 
rates,  
(2016 – 2005), yr 
Australia 0,3 0,3 0 
Austria 0,25 0,25 0 
Belgium 0,3399 0,3399 0 
Canada 0,361 0,265 –0,096 
Chile 0,17 0,255 0,085 
Czech Republic 0,24 0,19 –0,05 
Denmark 0,28 0,22 –0,06 
Estonia 0,23 0,2 –0,03 
Finland 0,26 0,2 –0,06 
France 0,3333 0,3333 0 
Germany 0,3834 0,2979 –0,0855 
Greece 0,29 0,29 0 
Hungary 0,16 0,09 –0,07 
Iceland 0,18 0,2 0,02 
Ireland 0,125 0,125 0 
Israel 0,31 0,24 –0,07 
Italy 0,3725 0,24 –0,1325 
Japan 0,4069 0,3086 –0,0983 
Korea, Rep. 0,275 0,22 –0,055 
Luxembourg 0,2963 0,2708 –0,0255 
Mexico 0,29 0,3 0,01 
Netherlands 0,296 0,25 –0,046 
New Zealand 0,33 0,28 –0,05 
Norway 0,28 0,24 –0,04 
Poland 0,19 0,19 0 
Portugal 0,275 0,21 –0,065 
Slovak Republic 0,19 0,21 0,02 
Slovenia 0,25 0,19 –0,06 
Spain 0,35 0,25 –0,1 
Sweden 0,28 0,22 –0,06 
Switzerland 0,213 0,1777 –0,0353 
Turkey 0,2 0,2 0 
United Kingdom 0,3 0,19 –0,11 
United States 0,4 0,4 0 
Source: (Corporate tax rates table, 2017); authors’ calculations 
 Table 2. Based macro-economic factors in OECD countries, 2016 yr., $bn 
Country GDP FDI GDP per 
capita 
FDI per 
capita 
FDI/GDP 
Australia 1339,1 38,639 56311 1625 0,029 
Austria 377,0 4,302 43775 500 0,011 
Belgium 455,1 –20,797 40324 –1843 –0,046 
Canada 1550,5 55,685 43249 1553 0,036 
Chile 240,8 20,457 13416 1140 0,085 
Czech Republic 185,2 2,479 17548 235 0,013 
Denmark 295,1 1,671 51989 294 0,006 
Estonia 22,5 –0,652 17119 –497 –0,029 
Finland 231,9 17,023 42311 3105 0,073 
France 2418,8 34,969 36206 523 0,014 
Germany 3363,4 46,227 41313 568 0,014 
Greece 194,9 1,141 18002 105 0,006 
Hungary 121,7 –2,624 12364 –267 –0,022 
Iceland 16,6 1,039 50173 3141 0,063 
Ireland 283,7 203,463 61134 43843 0,717 
Israel 299,4 11,510 35728 1373 0,038 
Japan 4123,3 –0,042 32477 0 0,000 
Korea 1377,9 5,042 27222 100 0,004 
Luxembourg 57,8 24,596 101450 43175 0,426 
Mexico 1143,8 32,056 9005 252 0,028 
Netherlands 750,3 101,789 44300 6010 0,136 
New Zealand 173,8 –0,135 37808 –29 –0,001 
Norway 386,6 –4,513 74400 –869 –0,012 
Poland 477,1 14,067 12555 370 0,029 
Portugal 198,9 0,633 19222 61 0,003 
Slovak Republic 87,3 1,151 16088 212 0,013 
Slovenia 42,8 1,680 20727 814 0,039 
Spain 1199,1 25,299 25832 545 0,021 
Sweden 495,6 16,682 50580 1702 0,034 
Switzerland 670,8 119,714 80945 14446 0,178 
Turkey 717,9 16,957 9126 216 0,024 
United Kingdom 2858,0 50,439 43876 774 0,018 
United States 18036,6 379,434 56116 1180 0,021 
Source: (World Development Indicators, 2017); authors’ calculations 
  
Results 
The available statistics were considered regarding to the above trends. I.e. we 
divided OECD countries and their data into three groups: 
1) countries which reduced the corporate tax burden during 2005-2016, 
2) countries which increased the corporate tax burden, and 
3) countries having a CIT rate in 2016 equal to the level of 2005. 
In addition, all countries were arranged by each of five indicators. 
The obtained results are presented in the Tables 3-7. 
The indicators GDP, FDI, GDP per capita, FDI per capita, FDI/GDP in tables 
3-7 are ranked in ascending order. 
 
Table 3. Ratios of the GDP indicators to the change of CIT rates in OECD 
countries (in the order of increasing of GDP), $bn 
GDP,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
GDP,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
20,047 0,02 467,956 0 
23,338 –0,03 471,364 0 
44,709 –0,06 514,460 –0,06 
58,631 –0,0255 668,851 –0,0353 
89,769 0,02 777,228 –0,046 
125,817 –0,07 863,712 0 
184,969 –0,05 1046,923 0,01 
192,691 0 1204,616 0 
195,305 –0,05 1237,255 –0,1 
204,837 –0,065 1411,246 –0,055 
238,503 –0,06 1529,760 –0,096 
247,028 0,085 1858,913 –0,1325 
304,819 0 2465,454 0 
306,900 –0,06 2647,899 –0,11 
317,745 –0,07 3477,796 –0,0855 
371,076 –0,04 4940,159 –0,0983 
390,800 0 18624,475 0 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
 Table 4. Ratios of the GDP per capita indicators to the change of CIT rates 
in OECD countries (in the order of increasing of GDP per capita), $ 
GDP per capita,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
GDP per capita,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
8208,556 0,01 39416,359 –0,05 
10862,600 0 40341,408 –0,11 
12421,319 0 41236,267 0 
12814,950 –0,07 42069,598 –0,0855 
13792,926 0,085 42157,928 –0,096 
16535,917 0,02 43402,863 –0,06 
17727,493 –0,03 44676,346 0 
17930,164 0 45669,815 –0,046 
18491,940 –0,05 49927,820 0 
19839,643 –0,065 51949,271 –0,06 
21652,278 –0,06 53549,701 –0,06 
26639,741 –0,1 57638,159 0 
27538,806 –0,055 59976,943 0,02 
30674,836 –0,1325 63861,922 0 
36854,968 0 70911,757 –0,04 
37175,742 –0,07 79890,524 –0,0353 
38900,569 –0,0983 100573,140 –0,0255 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
  
 Table 5. Ratios of the FDI indicators to the change of CIT rates in OECD 
countries (in the order of increasing of FDI), $bn 
FDI,  
2016 yr 
Change of CIT 
rate  
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
FDI,  
2016 yr 
Change of CIT 
rate  
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
–29,948 0 15,332 –0,06 
–17,717 –0,0353 16,758 0 
–16,428 –0,04 18,352 –0,1325 
–9,537 –0,06 26,857 –0,0255 
–1,183 0,02 32,106 –0,096 
0,742 –0,03 32,117 –0,1 
1,462 –0,06 33,930 0,01 
1,935 –0,05 34,905 –0,0983 
3,061 0 35,408 0 
3,548 0,02 37,013 0 
6,407 –0,06 42,049 0 
6,497 –0,05 52,474 –0,0855 
9,214 –0,065 68,715 –0,07 
10,827 –0,055 79,163 0 
11,903 –0,07 153,975 –0,046 
12,225 0,085 292,993 –0,11 
12,307 0 479,415 0 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
  
 Table 6. Ratios of the FDI per capita indicators to the change of CIT rates in 
OECD countries (in the order of increasing of FDI per capita), $ 
FDI per capita,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
FDI per capita,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
–3538,252 0,02 653,650 0,02 
–3423,710 0 682,613 0,085 
–3139,329 –0,04 691,511 –0,1 
–2116,208 –0,0353 707,867 –0,06 
–1735,638 –0,06 884,803 –0,096 
154,781 0 892,445 –0,065 
211,268 –0,055 1117,957 –0,06 
266,035 0,01 1392,589 –0,07 
274,852 –0,0983 1483,671 0 
284,811 0 1548,161 –0,06 
302,836 –0,1325 1742,824 0 
412,319 –0,05 3261,606 0 
441,604 0 4463,826 –0,11 
529,295 0 6998,867 –0,07 
563,336 –0,03 9047,557 –0,046 
615,184 –0,05 16585,330 0 
634,761 –0,0855 46069,738 –0,0255 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
  
Table. 7. Ratios of the FDI
GDP
 indicators to the change of CIT rates in OECD 
countries (in the order of increasing of FDI
GDP
) 
FDI/GDP,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
FDI/GDP,  
2016 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate 
(2016 – 2005, yrs.) 
–0,0766 0 0,0298 –0,06 
–0,0590 0,02 0,0318 –0,03 
–0,0443 –0,04 0,0324 0,01 
–0,0400 –0,06 0,0327 –0,06 
–0,0265 –0,0353 0,0333 –0,05 
0,0071 –0,0983 0,0349 0 
0,0077 –0,055 0,0356 0 
0,0099 –0,1325 0,0375 –0,07 
0,0105 –0,05 0,0395 0,02 
0,0142 0 0,0450 –0,065 
0,0144 0 0,0495 0,085 
0,0151 –0,0855 0,0791 0 
0,0159 0 0,1107 –0,11 
0,0209 –0,06 0,1981 –0,046 
0,0210 –0,096 0,2597 0 
0,0257 0 0,4581 –0,0255 
0,0260 –0,1 0,5461 –0,07 
Source: authors’ calculations 
From the Tables 3-7 it can be seen that 21 OECD countries have reduced the 
CIT rates (the 1
st
 group), 9 countries did not make any changes (2
nd
 group) and 4 
countries have increased the rates (the 3
rd
 group). For each of these groups we 
statistically tested the hypotheses about independence of selected efficiency 
indicators and the CIT rate. The essence of testing was as follows. 
There were checked all possible combinations 3 above behavioural types and 3 
OECD countries groups with different values of efficiency indicators: countries with 
high, middle (intermediate) and low efficiency. 
We divided OECD countries into three groups according to values of their 
efficiency indicators: countries with high, middle (intermediate) and low efficiency. 
In order to confirm assumption about the relationship between the trend of the 
change of the CIT rate and certain efficiency indicator, the number of economies in 
the corresponding groups should be in the 95% confidence interval. 
The obtained results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. The results of statistical hypothesis test of independence changes the 
CIT rate on indicators efficiency of economics 
Indicator number of countries in the 
sample meeting the criteria 
C.I. (95%) 
The tax change increase 
Number of countries meeting the criteria: 4 of 34 
low GDP 2 of 7 [0,28; 1,37] 
low FDI 2 of 10 [0,56; 1,79] 
low GDP per capita 3 of 8 [0,37; 1,51] 
low FDI per capita 2 of 8 [0,37; 1,51] 
high FDI/GDP 2 of 10 [0,56; 1,79] 
The tax change invariance 
Number of countries meeting the criteria: 9 of 34 
middle GDP 6 of 16 [2,73; 3,85] 
high FDI 5 of 9 [1,05; 3,72] 
high GDP per capita 4 of 9 [1,05; 3,72] 
high FDI per capita 4 of 9 [1,05; 3,72] 
middle FDI/GDP 6 of 15 [2,57; 5,47] 
The tax change decrease 
Number of countries meeting the criteria: 21 of 34 
high GDP 7 of 11 [3,49; 10,10] 
middle FDI 11 of 15 [5,76; 12,77] 
middle GDP per capita 14 of 15 [5,76; 12,77] 
middle FDI per capita 12 of 17 [6,97; 14,03] 
low FDI/GDP 7 of 9 [2,45; 8,67] 
Source: authors’ calculations 
Thus from the table 8 it can be seen that for all OECD countries the vast 
majority of hypotheses for independence between the trend of changes of the CIT tax 
rates and values of efficiency indicators (11 of 15, 73,3%) are rejected with 0,95 
probability. This shows that there is the mutual interaction between changes of the 
corporate tax burden and economic efficiency of countries according to all 
measurement methods. The obtained conclusion provides an answer to one of the 
tasks of our study which concerns the implicit dependence between government’s tax 
behaviour and each of five indicators of the economic efficiency for OECD countries. 
Moreover the above assumption that the government tax behaviour could be 
characterized as satisfier’s behavior is confirmed. Besides can assume that not only 
tax behaviour could be considered as satisfying but also any other economic 
behaviour of the government. 
Graphically, hypothesis testing for 3 possibly trends for each of 5 
macroeconomic indicators is showed on fig. 2-6, where a “peaks” on graphs below 
are indicate non-confirmation of the hypothesis about a certain type of independence 
of change of CIT tax rates (tax rate increase, tax rate decrease and tax rate invariance) 
from the certain indicator (GDP, FDI, GDP per capita, FDI per capita and FDI per 
GDP) for the sample defined by the coordinates on the graph. 
It could see that tax rate increase trends and tax rate invariance trends have 
enough large areas of confirmation of dependence of government tax behaviour on 
the value of the certain indicator for all 5 indicators. At once the tax rate decrease 
trend responds with a probability of 95% only to GDP per capita. 
Fig. 3a, b, c shows the above areas of confirmation of dependence government 
tax behaviour on GDP per capita. It is be seen that the propensity for tax rate increase 
is typical of countries with least or biggest GDP per capita; the propensity for tax rate 
invariance is typical of countries with biggest GDP per capita;  propensity for tax rate 
decrease is typical of countries with middle GDP per capita. 
 
  
 Fig. 2. Results of integral testing of hypothesis of independence of government 
tax behaviour from GDP 
   
a) tax rate increase b) tax rate decrease c) tax rate invariance 
axis of abscissas – first elements of the sample; 
axis of ordinates – last elements of the sample; 
axis of applicates: –1 – confirmation of the independence hypothesis;  
1 – non-confirmation of the independence hypothesis 
 
Fig. 3. Results of integral testing of hypothesis of independence of government 
tax behaviour from GDP per capita 
   
a) tax rate increase b) tax rate decrease c) tax rate invariance 
axis of abscissas – first elements of the sample; 
axis of ordinates – last elements of the sample; 
axis of applicates: –1 – confirmation of the independence hypothesis;  
1 – non-confirmation of the independence hypothesis 
 
 Fig. 4. Results of integral testing of hypothesis of independence of government 
tax behaviour from FDI 
   
a) tax rate increase b) tax rate decrease c) tax rate invariance 
axis of abscissas – first elements of the sample; 
axis of ordinates – last elements of the sample; 
axis of applicates: –1 – confirmation of the independence hypothesis;  
1 – non-confirmation of the independence hypothesis 
 
Fig. 5. Results of integral testing of hypothesis of independence of government 
tax behaviour from FDI per capita 
   
a) tax rate increase b) tax rate decrease c) tax rate invariance 
axis of abscissas – first elements of the sample; 
axis of ordinates – last elements of the sample; 
axis of applicates: –1 – confirmation of the independence hypothesis;  
1 – non-confirmation of the independence hypothesis 
 
 Fig. 6. Results of integral testing of hypothesis of independence of government 
tax behaviour from FDI
GDP
 
   
a) tax rate increase b) tax rate decrease c) tax rate invariance 
axis of abscissas – first elements of the sample; 
axis of ordinates – last elements of the sample; 
axis of applicates: –1 – confirmation of the independence hypothesis;  
1 – non-confirmation of the independence hypothesis 
 
The behaviour of countries with low and middle GDP per capita is completely 
consistent with of agent–maximizer’s behaviour: the countries with low GDP per 
capita rationally increase tax rate, for countries with the a large enough but not the 
maximum GDP per capita the fiscal function of taxes is already no so important, in 
return they use the regulatory function, seeking to improve the economic climate in 
the country because decreasing corporate tax rate. At once the countries with 
maximum GDP per capita do not pay enough attention to both fiscal and regulatory 
functions, keeping the fixed tax rate. Such behaviour is typical for “satisfactory” tax 
behaviour (satisfier’s behaviour1). 
 
  
                                           
1
 Here, in order to describe the behavior, we used the term “satisfiers” introduced by Simon (1955, 
1956), who distinguished the “maximizers”, aiming to maximize their own profit, and “satisfiers”, 
for whom it is enough to be profitable. 
Discussion 
These observations can be explained as follows. 
In general OECD countries tend to reduce the corporate tax burden in order to 
compensate for investors the potential loss of their profits. But this policy has its 
limits, since the taxes cannot be reduced incessantly. Thus, the low-efficient 
economies risk to face the underpayment of taxes and/or problems with provision of 
social benefits or to face the significant budget deficit. So, the these governments try 
to ensure the certain required level of budget revenue, notably, by increasing the 
corporate tax burden in order to collect more taxes. 
When the country achieves the minimum required level of budget revenue the 
government attempts to improve the investment climate in the economy, so the trend 
changes to the opposite, i.e. to the reduction of the tax burden. 
This behaviour is typical for countries with intermediate economic efficiency, 
while a large number of developed (the most efficient) countries are satisfied with 
this situation, maintaining the current CIT rates. Consequently, one part of the most 
efficient economies similarly reduces the CIT rate aiming to improve the tax climate 
and to increase the tax base, while the rest of them does not consider the reasons for 
changing taxes and they keep the status quo. So the behaviour of the most efficient 
economies varies from maximizers to satisfiers. 
And the opposite is true: the most of states with fixed CIT rates are among the 
most effective ones; the greater part of countries which increase the corporate tax 
burden are among the less efficient ones and the majority of countries with reduced 
tax pressure have the intermediate efficiency. In each of the above cases “majority” 
means the 60% and more of the total number of countries. 
I.e. it is sufficiently obvious that the efficiency of the economy is the main 
factor which influences on decision making on reduction, increase or maintaining the 
tax burden. The trend is the following: if the country is not among the economically 
efficient leaders and at the same time the risks of budget imbalances are insignificant, 
it tends to attract investment by reducing the corporate tax burden. Almost 40% of 
OECD countries adopted this way.  
Conclusion 
1. In order to study the government’s tax behaviour, the factors and conditions 
determining the decision-making, we analyzed its possible correlation with set of 
indicators of efficiency of economies, based on GDP and FDI, nominal and per 
capita, as well as the ratio of FDI to GDP. 
2. It found the correlation between the government’s tax behaviour (defined as the 
difference between corporate tax burden at the beginning and the end of period) 
and each of selected indicators. 
3. The analysis allowed us to divide the all OECD countries into three groups 
according their tax behaviour: that increase their CIT tax burden, that reduce it and 
that does not use the tax instruments, notably, in order to attract the foreign 
investors. 
4. It is found, government’s tax behaviour depends the most systemically on the 
indicator as GDP per capita, for each group of its values (low, middle, high) there 
is a separate statistically valid trend (increase, decrease and invariance of CIT tax 
rate). 
5. For the rest indicators such statistically verified connection is observed only for or 
increase trend and invariance trend of CIT tax rate. 
6. The government tax behaviour can be characterized as satisfying, i.e. governments 
in general act as satisfiers. In less efficient economies governments primarily aim 
to achieve the required level of budget revenue, so they tend to increase the tax 
burden. Governments of the economies with moderate efficiency which do not 
face the acute problem of budget fulfillment, consider the improvement of the 
economic climate and attraction of new investors by reducing the corporate tax 
burden as one of their main goals. 
7. The more “satisfied” are governments of the most efficient countries, many of 
whom does not use the regulatory function of the corporate tax, since they are 
satisfied with the current state of the country economy. 
8. However in general there is a trend related to the reduction of the tax burden, 
which can be considered not only as intention to attract the new investment, but 
also as the fight for investors. Under specific conditions such fight could lead to a 
“race to the bottom” situation, i.e. to the inefficient state of all economic systems 
participated in this race. Thus, determining the reasons, factors and conditions 
favoring the race to the bottom between OECD and other countries require the 
further investigation. 
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